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Introduction

A

nti-Muslim violence
swept through central
Burma in spring 2013,
reportedly sparked by
an argument at a gold
shop and the killing of a
Buddhist monk in the town of Meiktila
in Burma’s Mandalay Division, on
March 20, 2013.1 During the next three
days, attacks spread to neighboring
townships, as armed groups of men
from the majority Buddhist population
reportedly set fire to more than 1,500
homes,2 destroyed more than a dozen
mosques and three madrassas, and
killed more than 100 people3 among
the minority Muslim population.
Investigators with Physicians for Human
Rights (PHR) dispatched to the region
immediately following these events
interviewed survivors of a massacre of
students and teachers in Meiktila on
the morning of March 21. PHR investigators returned to the region in late
April to conduct additional in-depth
interviews and corroborate testimony
from survivors, eyewitnesses, and family members of those killed. For their security, the names and identifying details
of many of these informants have been
changed or withheld.

This report includes the most detailed
narrative to date of the attack on
Muslim students, teachers, and neighborhood residents in the Mingalar
Zayyone quarter of Meiktila, as compiled from interviews with 33 key informants, including 14 eyewitnesses. The
accounts include testimony that local
police stood by and watched while
hundreds of people went on a rampage
of violence and destruction, including
the killing of unarmed Muslims, and
that some Buddhist monks incited and
even participated in the attacks.
The anti-Muslim violence in Meiktila
provoked an international outcry, and
local prosecutors initiated proceedings.
Three Muslims were quickly convicted
of theft and assault in April in connection with the dispute at the gold shop,
and six Muslim men were arrested in
May on charges related to the killing
of a Buddhist monk in Meiktila. As of
mid-May, however, no one else had reportedly been charged or convicted for
assault, murder, or arson in a massacre
that left dozens of people dead, thousands displaced, and many of Meiktila’s
Muslim homes, mosques, schools, and
businesses destroyed.

At a time when the United States and
European Union have been lifting sanctions against Burma and strengthening
economic ties, PHR hopes this report
will refocus attention on a horrific
example of religious violence that has
become far too common in Burma in
the past several years, as PHR has documented. Unless more of that country’s
political and religious leaders firmly denounce such attacks and take concrete
steps to hold perpetrators accountable
and promote reconciliation, Burma’s
recent slow progress toward greater
freedom, openness, and peace could
be derailed.
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Background

T

he country of Burma
(officially the Union of
Myanmar) has a majority
Buddhist population
(approximately 82 percent,
according to government
figures) with a minority population of
Muslims (almost 4 percent, according
to government figures, but higher
according to the Muslim community),
who are concentrated in Arakan State
and in Mandalay, Bago, Magway,
Rangoon, and Irrawaddy divisions.4
Meiktila, a small city in central Burma,
is located roughly 125 kilometers
south of Mandalay and 125 kilometers
north of Burma’s capital, Naypyidaw.
Meiktila’s population of about 110,000
people is roughly one-tenth the size
of Mandalay, Burma’s second-largest
city.5
Despite its small size, Meiktila has a
diverse population of Buddhist, Hindu,
Muslim, and Sikh communities.6
Meiktila’s Muslim community accounted for roughly one third of the city’s
population prior to its March 2013
displacement.7 Muslim residents of
Meiktila form a sizable portion of the
city’s commercial sector.8

Violence against Muslims in Burma may
have roots in decades-old propaganda
campaigns that linked Buddhism with
Burmese national identity.9 Over the
past decade, repeated incidents of
violence against Muslims have been
documented in the areas surrounding
Meiktila. In 2006, Buddhists reportedly attacked homes, businesses, and
mosques belonging to Muslims in the
neighboring province of Magway,
resulting in three deaths.10 In 2003,
riots erupted between Buddhists and

Muslims in the nearby town of Kyaukse,
which killed 11 people and resulted in
the destruction of two mosques and
dozens of homes.11 In 2001, anti-Muslim violence that broke out across central Burma resulted in the destruction
of numerous mosques, businesses, and
homes.12
These simmering tensions erupted
again in three waves of violence against
Muslims from June 2012 through April
2013. The first, in early June 2012, occurred when sectarian violence erupted in Burma’s Arakan State between
Rakhine and Muslim communities,
with Muslim communities comprising
both the widely persecuted Rohingya
Muslims and non-Rohingya Muslims.13
The alleged rape and murder of a
Rakhine woman by three Muslim men
and the murder of 10 Muslims by
Rakhines in a reprisal attack are commonly cited as the proximate cause.14
Muslims reported cases of discriminatory and arbitrary arrest as well as
“physical abuse, rape, destruction of
property, and unlawful killings by mobs
of Rakhine Buddhists and security
forces.”15 Instead of protecting civilians
at risk, Burmese police either stood by
and allowed the attacks to continue or
actively contributed to the violence.16
The second wave of violence broke
out in Arakan State on October 21,
2012, in nine townships. Over 35,000
people were displaced by the violence
in October alone, over 97 percent
of whom were Muslim.17 More than
100,000 people were displaced by violence occurring since June 2012.18
Finally, on March 20, 2013, a seemingly
organized and coordinated wave of anti-Muslim violence erupted in Meiktila
and swept through Mandalay and
Bago Divisions, sporadically affecting
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Sagaing, Rangoon, and Magway divisions as well as Mon and Shan States.19
Anti-Muslim propaganda, often
preached by the prominent Buddhist
monk Sayadaw Wirathu, was reported
in many of these areas as well as in the
Irrawaddy Division during the same period. Largely Buddhist mobs devastated
numerous Muslim quarters, resulting
in the partial or full destruction of an
estimated 1,20020 to 1,600 houses,21
77 shops, and 37 mosques.22 In late
April and early May, anti-Muslim violence and threats of violence resumed
temporarily in parts of Rangoon and
Mandalay Divisions.23
According to official figures, the violence in March claimed the lives of
44 people24 and another 86 to 93
people were injured,25 while the attacks on April 30 reportedly left one
person dead and nine more injured.26
Alternative unverified estimates indicate
that as many as 148 persons may have
been killed between March 20 and
24.27 Burmese authorities claim that
the violence displaced 12,846 people,28
of whom 8,441 remained in seven
temporary camps in Meiktila as of
April 9.29 The UN has received reports
that at least 3,000 more displaced
people await assessment in affected
areas within and outside of Meiktila
Township.30

Map: Anti-Muslim Violence in
Burma March – April 2013
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Methods and Limitations

T

he findings of this report
are based on field investigations PHR conducted in
Burma from March 26 to 28,
2013, and from April 20 to
May 2, 2013. The PHR team
comprised Richard Sollom, MA, MPH,
director of emergencies at PHR; Holly
Atkinson, MD, FACP, director of the
Human Rights Program, Mount Sinai
Global Health, and assistant professor,
Department of Medicine, Icahn School
of Medicine at Mount Sinai; and Bill
Davis, MPH, former Burma project director at PHR.
Qualitative interviews with
eyewitnesses and other key
informants
The team conducted 33 interviews
with students and teachers of the
Mingalar Zayyone madrassa in
Meiktila, as well as religious leaders,
civil society representatives, and
government authorities. Among these
33 respondents were 14 eyewitnesses
to the Meiktila massacre, whose
accounts this report details, including
eight male students. The eyewitnesses
range in age from 9 to 72 (median 18),
and include men, women, boys, and
girls. The eyewitnesses are nearly all
Muslim, although one man—a member
of Parliament—is not Muslim.
To select these 14 information-rich
cases, field researchers conducted
purposeful intensity sampling to garner cases that highlighted individual
involvement and observation of various
incidents comprising the event (student
versus teacher versus families living
in the Mingalar Zayyone quarter). To
strengthen the qualitative research
design, field investigators further employed chain (or snowball) sampling to
locate corroborating witnesses, who
were interviewed independently, and

away from the original source, for probative evidence. Qualitative inquiry domains primarily centered on the events
that occurred in the 24-hour period
from noon on March 20 to about noon
on March 21, 2013, in the Mingalar
Zayyone quarter in Meiktila. To ensure
consistency, investigators followed an
interview format with probes to elicit
who, what, where, when, and how a
reported abuse took place. To facilitate
documentation of unanticipated issues,
investigators combined semi-structured
questions with open-ended questions.
Interviews were conducted in English
with a bilingual interpreter in private
settings. Interviews lasted typically between one-half hour and three hours.
Individuals who claimed to have witnessed the massacre were deemed
credible based on several factors,
including (1) reporting events that coincided with dates and times of known
events; (2) giving a consistent account
of events following redundant inquiries from different vantage points; (3)
citing neutral or positive actions on the
part of individual Buddhists, such as
policemen or civilian residents; (4) declining to answer a question when not
knowing the answer; and (5) presenting information in an emotionally congruent way. For example, most of the
eyewitnesses spoke hesitantly at the
most graphic parts of their testimonies
or they showed emotion (e.g., cracking
of the voice, tearing up, or crying) while
describing violent events.
Based on these criteria, all 14 eyewitnesses referenced in this document
were considered credible. The PHR
team cross-referenced all testimonies
and found the accounts consistent regarding both the specific incidents that
took place and the timeline of events.
Based on these testimonies and analysis of the physical destruction at the
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scene, PHR investigators established a
nuanced sequence of events that constitute the composite narrative.
Location of the interviews
The PHR field team conducted the
interviews in four primary locations
in Burma: (1) Mandalay and two outlying villages; (2) Meiktila and three
surrounding villages; (3) Naypyidaw,
and one nearby village; and (4) the city
of Rangoon. Specific village names
are withheld to ensure the security of
witnesses.
The PHR field team exercised security
precautions while driving to the various locations and interviewing study
participants. When visiting Muslim villages, establishments, and homes, the
team engaged a Muslim driver and the
interpretation services of two Muslim
translators. But while in predominantly
Buddhist enclaves—such as the city of
Meiktila itself—the team engaged an
interpreter self-identified as Buddhist.
Because tensions remain high in
Meiktila, many Muslims were fearful of
entering the city, and community leaders advised them not to do so. Names
of interviewees were never written
down, nor were photos taken of either
the interviewees or the houses in which
they were interviewed. All field notes
were uploaded to a secure site nightly,
and duplicates were made of all photographic evidence.
Ethics Review Board approval of
methods of the investigation
An independent PHR ethics review
board (ERB) approved the methods
used for this investigation prior to
the study. In reviewing the investigators’ plan to protect human subjects,
the ERB was guided by the World
Medical Association’s Declaration of
Helsinki: Ethical Principles for Medical
Research Involving Human Subjects.31
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continued from page 6

As the cohort of most of the reported survivors of the alleged school
massacre is under age 18, PHR field
investigators anticipated interviewing
minors who were eyewitnesses to the
event. Since this cohort is considered
a vulnerable population with respect
to human-subject research, the ERB
specifically addressed the selection and
interviewing of children as part of the
study. Standards that the field team
followed for interviewing minors were
guided by ESOMAR’s World Research
Codes and Guidelines for Interviewing
Children and Young People,32
The Population Council’s Ethical
Approaches to Gathering Information
from Children and Adolescents in
International Settings: Guidelines and
Resources,33 and UNICEF’s Guidelines
for Interviewing Children.34 All in-person medical evaluations of torture
and ill treatment were conducted in
accordance with the United Nations
Manual on Effective Investigation
and Documentation of Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (also known
as the “Istanbul Protocol”).
Precautions were taken to protect the
privacy and anonymity of the eyewitnesses and the confidentiality of their
personal information. To minimize the
impact on their physical, mental, and
social integrity, interviewees in this
report are provided with single-name
pseudonyms, and some identifying information has been withheld.
PHR investigators obtained informed
oral consent from each participant
following a detailed explanation of
PHR, the purpose of the investigation,
and the potential benefits and risks of
participation. Oral rather than written consent was obtained to ensure
anonymity and security. In the case of
a minor, permission was additionally

obtained orally from the child’s parent
or guardian to ensure that he or she
was confident that the safety, rights,
and interests of the child were being
safeguarded during the interview. At
least one parent of all the children
interviewed by the PHR field team
was either present or nearby during
the interview. Interviews were halted
if the child became distraught in any
way. Of the nine interviews conducted
with minors who were eyewitnesses,
the PHR field team terminated three
of them early because of emotional
distress. PHR investigators employed
additional safeguards for respondents
under age 12: The investigators listened
to their uninterrupted narrations and
did not ask probing questions. Those
two interactions were kept purposefully
short. PHR obtained additional consent
to conduct a physical evaluation of one
survivor. This evaluation was based on
the Istanbul Protocol.
Limitations of the study
By its nature, this study is subject to
certain limitations. The field team’s
qualitative research was designed to
yield an in-depth understanding of an
incident in which abuses were committed by armed groups of civilians and
complicit officials, including police, at
one specific location in March 2013.
The non-random selection of survivors
of the massacre does not permit generalization of PHR’s findings to all acts
of violence against Muslims in Burma.
Furthermore, seven survivors of the
Mingalar Zayyone massacre did not
agree to be interviewed. Anecdotally,
the PHR field team was told that these
people had witnessed some of the
most heinous acts committed, were
suffering from insomnia, nightmares,
and other symptoms of psychological
distress, and were fearful of reprisal by
the authorities. Thus, the testimonies
included in this report may not reflect
the total number or variety of crimes

allegedly committed. This study is also
subject to sampling bias as only one
non-Muslim person is included among
the 14 witnesses. Moreover, the investigation’s limited focus does not permit
a full analysis of the human rights situation in Burma at the time.
To mitigate recall bias among interviewees, investigators conducted all interviews within six weeks of the incident.
As some trauma survivors are known
to experience memory impairment
(dissociation), corroboration was sought
among eyewitness sources. Further
corroboration of witness testimony
was sought and obtained from objective sources (e.g., physical evaluations,
crime scene analysis, and review of
photographic and video evidence).
This investigative study should thus be
construed as a snapshot in time, providing partial rather than complete accounts or prevalence reports of human
rights violations. Notwithstanding these
limitations, the study produced sufficient data on which to base informed
recommendations.
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Composite Narrative of
Mingalar Zayyone Massacre

T

he following chronological
account of the killings in the
Mingalar Zayyone quarter
of Meiktila on March 20-21,
2013, is assembled from
the separate accounts of 14
eyewitnesses, who experienced the
violence from a variety of locations and
perspectives. They included one member of Parliament, eight students who
were able to flee from their madrassa
after it was attacked at night, and five
residents of the Mingalar Zayyone
quarter who were caught up in this targeted violence.
The resulting narrative is a composite
constructed from their testimonies
and verified to the extent possible by
the PHR field team as described in the
Methods and Limitations section. The
names are pseudonyms to protect the
witnesses’ identities. Each statement
is attributed to the informant(s) who
provided it; even when paraphrased,
the language and descriptors used are
their own. Time references were facilitated by a number of factors, including
the daily routine of established meal
times at the school, the prevalence of
cell phones among the students, and
the Buddhist practice of marking prayer
time with the ringing of bells.

Pseudonyms and reference
numbers of the 14 eyewitnesses
Preteen students:
• Soe (no. 08)
• Myint (no. 09)
Teenage students:
• Thant (no. 01)
• Maung (no. 02)
• Aung (no. 04)
• Phyu (no. 13)
Older students:
• Htun (no. 10)
• Htay (no. 21)
Residents of Mingalar Zayyone:
• Thiri (no. 17) – mother and wife of
slain man
• Hla (no. 18) – teenage daughter of
Thiri
• Yon (no. 19) – teenage daughter of
Thiri
• Lwin (no. 20) – teenage son of Thiri
• Sein (no. 21) – young son of Thiri
Member of Parliament:
• Win Htein (his real name; no. 25)

Massacre in Central Burma: Muslim Students Terrorized and Killed in Meiktila

Scene of the massacre: An Islamic
boarding school in Mingalar
Zayyone
The town of Meiktila, situated halfway
between the cities of Mandalay and
Rangoon in central Burma, had four
Islamic schools (madrassas). In the
town’s Muslim quarter of Mingalar
Zayyone, the well-regarded Himayathol
Islamic boarding school for boys was
unique in offering instruction in English,
Burmese, mathematics, and computer
science in addition to Islamic studies.35
The founder of the school, which was
formerly an orphanage, established the
madrassa in 2009.36 The school was divided into five classes, from beginner to
advanced, that were taught by 10 male
teachers.37
The boarding school housed 120 students ranging in age from 11 to 27.38
Some of the older students had already
obtained a university degree, but were
attending Himayathol for advanced
religious studies. Htun, for example, is
an older student who began his studies
when the school opened in 2009. He
had previously graduated from a secular school and then matriculated at
Mingalar Zayyone for religious studies.
There were also approximately 20 day
students, like Soe, a young boy who
was a student there for the past year
and a half along with his older brother,
Myint. Soe and Myint live with their
family in a small house near the school,
where their father [name withheld] was
one of the teachers. [Their father was
killed during the violence on March 21.]

Composite Narrative of
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continued from page 8
Students hide while violence
spreads throughout Muslim
neighborhoods
On the morning of March 20, Myint
walked to school with his father and
younger brother as usual. They had
their midday meal at school and afterwards he played in his uncle’s [name
withheld] home next to the school with
three classmates. One of the women
who cleaned the school came to tell
them that there was violence in town
and a problem at a gold shop.39 Myint
was across the street, and his father
called for him to come back to school.
Shortly thereafter, Myint saw smoke
rising in the direction of the center of
town.40 Maung said he and the other
students did not realize the seriousness
of the situation at the time and were
joking around.41
A man who lived in the quarter also
came to the school and told the teachers to “keep everyone in the school
and don’t go into town.”42 One of the
teachers then told all the boys to go to
the mosque next door, as they were
going to make an announcement. The
boys were told that they were all to
stay in the school and not venture out
as it was not safe.43 Three other students each similarly reported that the
teachers informed them that “it was
not a good situation in town” and that
a mosque had been attacked and destroyed.44 Sensing there was a problem
between Buddhists and Muslims, the
teachers told the students to take off
their caps (taqiyah) so as not to call attention to their Muslim identity.45 They
also told the students to remain calm
and quiet.46 The teacher decided that
if their madrassa was attacked they
would not resist and instead would
plead for the attackers not to harm
the students. The teachers told the
students “not to raise a fist” if the “terrorists” came.47

In the foreground a Muslim home in Meiktila, Burma that has been destroyed while the Buddhist home and temple behind were unscathed.
Photo: Richard Sollom

After the announcement, all the boys—
about 120 of them—went back to
school to attend classes.48 Later that
afternoon, Phyu saw black smoke rise
from the center of town. The teachers
told Phyu and the other students to
gather their ID cards and any money
they had. The group stayed inside the
building with the lights off.49

At around 4 p.m. they received word
that the Muslim quarter close to theirs
was ablaze and that a mosque near
the main market had been burned
down.50 The situation was apparently
worsening.51 Fear spread throughout
the school, and some of the students
began to cry.52 Upon receiving this
news, the teachers decided to divide
the school into groups of five students,
with one teacher or older student
charged with looking after each group
of students.53
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Composite Narrative of
Mingalar Zayyone Massacre
continued from page 9
At about 9:30 p.m., Aung heard loud
voices coming from a group of men
outside the school.61 One of the older students heard what sounded like
buildings being destroyed a few blocks
away.62 Students and teachers stayed
at the school until the armed men surrounded the school.63 There was chaos, and some students were crying.64
Fearing for their lives, all of the students and teachers ran out the school’s
front gate and hid in a nearby area
called Wat Hlan Taw a few minutes
away on foot.65 This boggy area, measuring 95 by 80 meters, is overgrown
with a variety of vegetation, including
tall grasses.66
A sign showing the prayer times is burned inside a mosque in Meiktila, Burma.
Photo: Paula Bronstein/Getty Images
Attack on Islamic school
and mosque
At approximately 7:30 p.m., after eating dinner, the students heard news
that Buddhists were congregating
and organizing up on the main road,
with the intent to attack the school.54
The main road can be seen from the
school, and Htay said it was terrifying
to watch the crowd form. He could
hear them chanting, “Kill the Kalars!”
(Kalar means “foreigner” and is used as
an anti-Muslim slur.) Htay couldn’t estimate the size of the crowd— he said
there were too many to count.55

At about 8 p.m., Phyu heard a crowd
of people outside. Someone shouted,
“We must not surrender all the time
to the Kalars!” Some students and
teachers were receiving phone calls
warning them that crowds of armed
Buddhists were coming to the school.56
At about 8:30 p.m., the teachers closed
the main door of the school and put
all the younger boys in the back room
for safety.57 The teachers told Soe and
the other students to try to get some
sleep. But five minutes later, Soe heard
a lot of noise coming from outside the
school. Myint also heard loud voices
and the sound of blowing whistles
coming closer.58 Both were afraid.59
At around 9 p.m., a local official from
Mingalar Zayyone quarter came to
the school and informed them that he
would not be able to protect them. The
“Buddhist terrorists” arrived minutes
later, according to Maung.60
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As the group fled the school and
headed to the grassy area, Htay said,
they split into smaller groups to hide.
Phyu and the others hid in small groups
among the bushes until the early hours
of the morning.67 Other people from
the quarter were already hiding in the
tall grass when they arrived.68
At that time, a Muslim resident of
Mingalar Zayyone quarter and mother
of five children heard a group of people coming toward her. At first, Thiri
and her family were very frightened,
but then she realized that the students
from the school had evacuated and
were joining them in the tall grass.69
Htay said that the grass was “very high,
almost up to my armpits,” and that
they were able to sit in the mud and be
completely hidden by the grass.70 Sein
said the grass was “like a jungle, with
very deep water.” They remained there
the whole night, standing up and not
sleeping.71

Composite Narrative of
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continued from page 10
Not long after the students joined local
residents in the grass, a mob set fire
to the mosque and started to destroy
the school.72 They were chanting, “Find
the Kalars and kill them!” Gangs of
men went door to door in the quarter,
searching for Muslims. Unable to find
any in their homes, the gangs left the
immediate vicinity.73 Thiri’s husband
became very fearful at this point and
said he thought they were going to be
killed. He asked her forgiveness for “all
the misery he had caused her in life.”
She said she tried to reassure him, and
said, “We are safe among the students;
they wouldn’t kill them.”74
At one point, Thiri said, a car pulled
up in the quarter, and a local authority
stepped out and instructed the mob,
“Don’t set fire to the Kalars’ houses.
The fire might jump to Buddhist homes.
But you can destroy all the Muslim
homes that you want.”75 A 13-year-old
boy reported that the following morning he heard a Buddhist monk make a
similar comment.76
Students watch their school burn
to the ground
In the dark, the students and other Muslim residents from Mingalar
Zayyone quarter hid in the bushes.
Maung was with a group of six other
students and a teacher. At around
3 a.m., the teacher and two students in
his group left their hiding place to see if
it was safe to return to the school. They
did not return. Later, while it was still
dark, he saw people with flashlights
around the school, and thought it was
not safe to go back.77

Site of the Mingalar Zayyone madrassa which was burned to the ground in March 2013.
Photo: Richard Sollom

Myint heard men near the school yell,
“Where are you, Kalars? If you have
courage, come out!” Myint was with
his father, who told him and the others
to be very quiet.78 No one slept that
night as they hid in the bushes.79 Lwin’s
family stayed awake and alert the entire night, unable to sleep, as they were
standing in mud and water and were
very afraid.80

Hiding in the bushes about 100 meters
away from the school in Wat Hlan Taw,
the students watched men attack and
burn their school and neighboring
Muslim homes.82 The school was set on
fire by the men throwing “fire sticks.”83
That whole night, bands of young and
middle-aged men armed with weapons
roamed the Muslim quarter.84 Myint
was shaking he was so afraid.85

Thiri said her group was exhausted and
growing more terrified, as fire in the
quarter moved closer to them in the
grass. They were unable to sleep, as the
area they were standing in was waterlogged, muddy, and filled with snakes.
Thiri tried to comfort her 9-year-old
son, who clung to her until the early
morning. All the time they stood in the
tall grass, they could hear roving bands
of men destroying homes.81

While it was still dark, Soe heard men
yelling. One man screamed, “Kill all the
Kalars! If you have courage, come outside.”86 Myint heard a car or mini-bus
stop on the main road and a group of
men get out. One of them shouted,
“A Kalar ran into Wat Hlan Taw. Follow
him!” Then he saw people with flashlights come toward him and the others.
They were about 20 meters away.
[Myint drew a detailed map of the
area.] Myint also heard someone yell,
“Wake up, people of Oat Kyin.
Kalars are in Wat Hlan Taw. Show
your courage and kill them all!”
[Oat Kyin is the Buddhist quarter
next to Wat Hlan Taw.]87
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Flushed out of the grass with
spotlights, students flee
Soon after the Buddhists began ringing
the 4 a.m. prayer bell,88 Thiri heard a
growing crowd congregating on the
embankment bordering Meiktila Lake.89
According to Htay, the group spotted a
Muslim man driving on the main road
on top the embankment. Htay heard
the crowd yell, “Catch him and beat
him!” As the car turned around and the
headlights shone down the embankment and lit up the grassy area below,
men up on the road shouted, “There
are Kalars in the weeds!”90 A man
yelled, “There’s a Kalar, get him!”91
Nine-year-old Sein heard the mob cry
out, “Find and kill the Kalars!”92
According to Thiri, the mob discovered
at least one student in the grass, who
had been slow to follow the rest of
the group because he was on his cell
phone talking with his mother. A few
moments later they heard the group of
men descend upon the student with
sticks. Thiri said they listened in horror
as the group of men beat the screaming student.93 Htay reported that two
students who remained in the grass
were killed.94
While it was still dark, the group of 150
students, teachers, and others from the
neighborhood who had been hiding
all night in Wat Hlan Taw began to run
back toward the school, away from the
main road.95 The entire group ran to
get out of the grass and sought refuge
in a nearby residential compound.96
Myint saw some in his group break
down the bamboo fence of the western wall of the compound, where there
were four buildings.97 While the students were running from the bushes to
the neighbor’s house, the armed men
saw them and followed them to the
house where others were hiding.98

General view of the destruction in Mingalar Zayyone quarter, including burnt out homes, the
mosque, and the school.
Photo: Hein Aung

Seeking refuge in a residential
compound, women and children
are attacked
The men escorted the women and the
younger children, including Myint, to
the one brick house on the property.99
Once inside the house, Sein’s mother
told him to sit on the floor next to his
sisters.100 “Many were crying, especially the younger children, and all of
us were terrified,” Thiri said.101 About
150 Muslims eventually hid in the compound (120 students, seven teachers,
five females, and about 20 others
from the quarter).102 People hid in four
buildings on the property, according to
Phyu, who hid with his friends in the
shed (an empty chicken coop) within
the walled compound.103
According to one of the older students,
a gang came down from the main
road to the compound and surrounded
it.104 Some students started to pray,
chanting Allah Akbar.105 Hearing this,
the mob outside the compound started
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chanting nationalist songs.106 Maung
heard loud voices outside and men
saying they were going to break down
the gate of the compound. [Several of
the witnesses drew maps of the area
depicting four buildings situated within
a walled compound.]107
Just before dawn, the wooden fence
behind the shed was set on fire.108
Maung’s small group then ran next
door to another building in the compound and found a large group of
more than 100 students and others
hiding inside. At around 6 a.m., the
mob started throwing rocks, red
bricks, and flaming sticks of wood at
the compound where they were hiding.109 Myint described the “fire sticks”
as pieces of wood wrapped in cloth
soaked in gasoline and then ignited.110
From inside one of the houses, Sein
could hear the mob throwing things
at the house.111 Through one of the
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windows, Aung saw around 20 men
whom he did not recognize begin to
attack the house.112
As time passed, more and more of the
mob came down the embankment and
encircled the compound, continuing
to pelt the courtyard and buildings
with stones, rocks, bricks, and sticks.113
When the Buddhists began attacking
the house in which Maung was hiding,
he and five other students ran out and
hid in the shed.114 About 10 minutes
later, Phyu saw a group of armed men
approach the shed where they were
hiding.115
Two younger children were hit in the
head and face with rocks while sitting
in one of the houses.116 Some of the
Muslims started throwing objects back
at the mob over the compound wall,117
and the men in the compound armed
themselves with anything they could
find on the ground in preparation for
more attacks.118 Some of the houses
around them were burning at this
point—and many of the older students
in the group were working to put out
fires.119
Buddhist monks and police march
Muslims out of the compound
Through a window inside one of the
houses, Myint could see police standing
on the raised embankment and watching as the mob attacked the compound.120 Member of Parliament and
National League for Democracy party
member Win Htein told PHR investigators that he had walked from his home
in Meiktila that morning to Mingalar
Zayyone quarter. He said the main road
along the embankment was filled with
many hundreds of people, including
police.121
Between 8 and 9 a.m., an estimated
15 to 20 police in blue uniforms with
black and blue helmets, carrying rifles

and anti-riot shields, arrived in several
military trucks that they parked on the
main road along the embankment.122
They then walked about 200 meters to
the compound and encircled it.123 The
apparent commander had three stars
on his epaulets.124
From inside one of the houses, Aung
heard police yell for the occupants to
come out.125 Htay said the police came
to the gate of the compound to tell
them that two students had been killed
and to request that some of the teachers should go outside into the grass to
claim the bodies. Htay said everyone
was too afraid to go outside.126
A Buddhist monk came to the compound gate, talked to the police, and
then yelled to the group, “Put down
your weapons.” A Muslim woman in
the group went to the gate and said,
“There are women here. We are not
associated with the incident at the gold
shop. We are asking for your forgiveness; please don’t set fire to this compound.”127 The monk then asked, “Do
you want to get out? If you want to get
out, then you must listen to what I say.
So put down your weapons.”128 Htay
heard the monk say to the police, “I
can take all the students out.”129
The police told everyone to keep
their heads down and they would
be protected from the mob that had
assembled.130 Those who had armed
themselves with various objects laid
them down. Aung believed that the
police were there to protect them from
the mob, so he and the other students,
teachers, and some residents of his
quarter began to line up two-by-two
and marched out of the compound
with their hands clasped behind their
heads.131 Aung was in the middle of the
line.132 Thiri, her ill husband, and their
five children were in the front of the

line.133 Myint’s father told him to go to
the front as well. This was the last time
Myint saw his father.134
Police lead Muslims through
the mob
As soon as they left the compound,
Myint saw the mob begin to club some
of the students. As he is small, he said
other students around him protected
him. Some students were hit with red
bricks and beaten with motorcycle
chains and exhaust pipes.135 Myint saw
men with long swords and slingshots
attack the unarmed group.136 Aung also
saw men stone and club the unarmed
civilians as they were marched toward
Oat Kyune quarter—about 150 meters
from the school and beside the pond.137
Thiri reported that the police did not
intervene to control the groups of men
who were destroying the neighborhood.138 Phyu said the police watched
and did nothing to prevent or stop the
Buddhists from stoning and hitting the
students and others as they marched
out of the compound.139 Myint also
reported that the police, who were
holding rifles, did not intervene and
forced the group to keep marching
with their hands above their heads.140
They followed a small path toward the
embankment where several large military transport trucks were parked.141
Several witnesses reported hearing
gunshots. Phyu said the shooting started when someone in the mob threw
a rock at his group, but hit one of the
policemen instead. The police officer
(who wore two stars on his shoulder)
in turn fired his rifle several times in the
air.142 Thiri saw the police then shoot
once into the mob, grazing one of the
attackers in the thigh. Some of the attackers yelled at the policeman, “Don’t
shoot us, shoot the Muslims!”143
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Thiri said she was carrying her baby,
her husband was leaning on one arm
(he was having trouble breathing), and
her younger son was clasping her other
arm. Her younger daughter was a little
ahead of them in the crowd, while her
older daughter walked by her side. She
and others fell into “newly dug pits”
along the path. The holes were “about
waist deep.” She fell into one with her
baby and had a hard time getting up as
other people were stepping on them.
She tried to stand up but fell a second
time. Then a student pulled her up out
of the hole.144 Sein was walking beside
his mother. While on the narrow path,
he tripped and fell because he was
trying to avoid “holes in the ground.”
Lwin encountered the same pits dug
into the dirt path.145 Both students said
a lot of broken glass covered the dirt
path.146
Lwin said the police only pretended to protect the Muslims but led
them straight into a group of armed
Buddhists instead.147 The police told
them they were going to the main
road, which was next to the Buddhist
quarter along the embankment.148 They
forced the group of more than 150
Muslims to continue marching along
the path for about 15 minutes until
they reached the edge of the Buddhist
quarter called Oat Kyune.149 Htay heard
people shouting, “Don’t let any of the
Kalars come into our quarter.”150 A local
authority from the quarter shouted,
“Tanari!”—a derogatory term meaning
“keep out,” often used in reference
to dogs—and said that if they came
into the Buddhist quarter, “We will kill
you.”151
File of marchers is abused, beaten,
and humiliated
When they reached the edge of
Mingalar Zayyone Muslim quarter,
Aung saw hundreds of people, including about 10 Buddhist monks in

saffron robes, who did not allow them
to pass.152A man standing near one
of the monks shouted, “We will kill
them all!”153 That monk replied with a
laugh, “Don’t kill them in your quarter,
otherwise the Kalar ghosts will come
here.”154 Thiri heard the monk say, “Let
them walk to the main road—and we
can kill them there.”155
Many men carrying bamboo sticks,
knives, swords, slingshots, chains, and
motorcycle exhaust pipes then started
to attack the group.156 Right in front of
her, Thiri saw one man start to beat an
older woman with a bamboo stick. One
of the students ran to protect her, and
another man took a horizontal swing
at the boy with a long knife, first slicing
into his neck. The second blow came
down vertically on top of the boy’s
skull, at the frontal bone, and passed
through the jaw. Thiri said the boy’s
entire face was sliced off and he fell to
the ground.157
She then witnessed two students in
front of her being beaten by a group of
men with bamboo sticks and exhaust
pipes. One fell to the ground and didn’t
move; the other boy fell to the ground
on his back, and when he moved, a
man used the end of a wooden plank
to stab him in the face several times.
“Only the people in the middle of the
line of people did well,” Thiri said.158
Htay, who was in the middle of the escorted group, said students in the back
were severely injured and killed. He also
said that the attacking gang of men
targeted the leaders and the wealthy
in the Muslim community—dragging
them away and killing them. He said
about six people he knew from the
neighborhood were killed, as well as a
number of students.159
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Htay himself was beaten “many, many
times.”160 He fell down, and was set
upon by men with sticks, swords, and
chains. He was able to get up once, but
was struck down again. At that point,
Htay lost consciousness.161
When Htay regained consciousness a
few minutes later, he observed that
the gang who had been beating him
had moved away and begun to beat
another student lying face down on the
ground. When that student lifted his
head, one of the men lifted his sword
and brought it down on the back of
the student’s neck, essentially decapitating him.
Thiri’s 16-year-old daughter, Hla, said
Buddhists were handing Muslims pieces
of pork and forcing them to eat.162 Lwin
said some of the Buddhists were harassing the Muslims, taunting them by
saying, “Here! You must eat this pork!”
Others were laughing, saying, “Hey,
don’t feed them too much of it. They’ll
come to like it, and we’ll have to feed
them more of it!”163 Thiri said she heard
some of the police laughing.164
Other Buddhists in the crowd showed
kindness. Hla was ahead of her mother,
younger brother, and father. She was
next to her neighbor who was holding
her baby. One of the Buddhists in the
crowd blocking the path recognized
her neighbor and said, “I don’t want to
hit you and the baby. Come with me.”
Hla said the man pulled the woman
off the path and beckoned for Hla
and her brother to follow.165 He took
them into his house at the edge of Wat
Hlan Taw, where Hla said there were
already about 15 other Muslim women
and girls hiding.166 The house owner
grabbed a head shawl and dressed her
brother in it so he might be spared as a
girl if they were all discovered.167
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Police and monks force Muslims to
violate their dietary laws and pray
as Buddhists
A Buddhist monk told a group of students, teachers, and other Muslims
to squat on the ground with their
hands above their heads.168 He said,
“If you don’t want to die, you must
sit and worship us.” [Myint and Phyu
demonstrated the squat position they
were forced to adopt, with the soles of
their feet on the ground, knees bent,
and hands clasped together above the
forehead.]169 The monk then said, “You
are under our control, and we can do
what we want with you. So pray like a
Buddhist.” And they did.170
Another young eyewitness, Yon, said
that they were forced to pray, circled by
men armed with knives. A policeman
complained that they were not praying
like a Buddhist but were all cheating
and praying to Allah; he ordered them
all to turn to the east and pray like
Buddha, and they were given more
pork to eat.171
After the prayers, the police instructed
the entire group of Muslims to go up to
the main road.172 Some found the embankment too steep, so they sat back
down while others continued climbing
up to the main road. As they were
making their way up, Yon was separated from her father.173 Some policemen
with riot shields stationed themselves
around the seated group, as if to protect them.174 Both Lwin and Htay said,
however, that when someone charged
them, the police stepped aside and let
the person attack.175
Crowd of onlookers encourages
armed men to attack Muslims
The crowd of onlookers along the
embankment and on the main road
numbered many hundreds, according
to three witnesses.176 Large, armed men
ran down the bank toward the group

of Muslims and began attacking them
with swords, clubs, wooden batons,
and metal pipes.177 Other Buddhists
joined—even some of the monks beat
them, Aung said.178 A 39-year-old
witness estimated the mob comprised
about 100 armed men, including
some 10 to 20 Buddhist monks in
saffron robes.179 The rest of the crowd
watched from above.180 Member of
Parliament Win Htein, who was witness
to the events, said that some of these
Buddhists were clapping, cheering,
and encouraging the men to attack
and kill.181 Htay heard the crowd on
the road encouraging the attackers
too, chanting, “Kill the Kalars! Kill the
Kalars!”182

Maung saw “blood the
color of the monks’
[saffron] robes.” He
thought they would be
safe because monks
were there, but instead
he saw his friends
being killed.
One monk instructed the mob to go up
the embankment toward the main road
to wait for the Muslim group there.183
Thiri, with a baby still in her arms and
her feeble husband, older daughter,
and younger son at her side, started
up the embankment to the main road.
Suddenly, two men appeared in front
of her. “We are only allowing women
to the main road.” One of the men
shoved his hand in her husband’s face,
knocking him backward off his feet.
The other man tried to pull her baby
son from her arms. A third man yanked
her 13-year-old son away from her,
saying to Lwin, “You’re a boy, you can’t

go with her.”184 A policeman standing
nearby grabbed Lwin’s arm and pulled
him away from the attacker, saying,
“Let him go!” and shoved him back
toward his mother. Lwin said, “I know
that policeman saved my life.”185 Thiri
and the other women, now in a group,
went up to the main road, several of
them leaving their husbands behind.186
When the women reached the main
road, they were again instructed to “sit
down, pull down your scarf, and don’t
look back.”187
Police stand by as armed gangs
massacre unarmed Muslims
One of the local leaders told the seated
group not to move, according to two
witnesses.188 One of the older students,
Htay, said that his classmate, [name
withheld], moved slightly to reposition
his legs and was suddenly attacked by
two men. One had a sword and used it
to slice open a long gash in the young
man’s quadriceps muscle. Another attacker poured gasoline into the bleeding wound and lit him on fire. Htay said
the group on the ground, only about
30 meters away, watched his classmate
burn to death by the water well. They
were all terrified but were trying not to
move, fearing they might be killed as
well.189 In perhaps the same event, another student saw one man stab a boy
who was on fire. Maung saw “blood
the color of the monks’ [saffron]
robes.” He thought they would be safe
because monks were there, but instead
he saw his friends being killed.190
According to two witnesses, four men
beat with hard bamboo another young
student in the grove of trees below
the embankment. A young female,
Hla, said that while the boy was still
shaking and twitching on the ground,
someone poured gasoline on him out
of a plastic container and set him on
fire.191Aung also witnessed this event.
He saw someone pour clear liquid from
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a one-gallon jug on his 10-year-old
classmate and then use a lighter to set
the boy on fire. Aung watched in terror
some 10 meters away while the young
boy fell to the ground burning and
screaming in agony.192
Thiri’s husband was stabbed with a
knife twice in the abdomen, according
to one of the older students present.193
The mob then dragged his body and
four others to form a pile. While “the
bodies were still shaking and moving”
two women collected dried leaves under the trees and threw them on top
of the men, poured gasoline on them,
and lit a fire, according to two witnesses.194 Thiri smelled burning flesh,
and grabbed the leg of a policeman
who was standing near her. She said,
“There’s a fire! Please, please put it
out!” The policeman replied, “Don’t
look back; if you do, we can set fire to
you, too.”195

Yon heard a monk
say,“If you want to
kill the plant, you
need to cut the root.
If you come back,
we will kill you all.”
Nineteen-year-old Phyu saw 17 of his
friends and fellow students stabbed
and killed. [During the interview, Phyu
listed their names, including five of his
closest friends, and approximate ages.
He began to cry.] He saw other lifeless
bodies on the ground, but could not
identify them because he did not see
their faces.196

Aung also reported witnessing five
men with clubs and swords attack his
20-year-old classmate. One of the men
stabbed the young man three times in
the stomach after he had fallen to the
ground. According to Aung, the police
and monks watched and did nothing to
prevent or stop these killings.197
While Myint’s group sat on the grassy
field, the monks and police told the
others to march up the embankment
toward the trucks parked on the main
road. It was then that Myint saw a
man club his friend, Abubakar, a fellow
student about his age. Abubakar fell to
the ground. Myint next saw Abubakar
burning alive. Another man told Myint
to keep his eyes down, saying: “If
you dare look up, we will beat you to
death.” Crying and shaking with fear,
Myint remained squatting looking
down at the ground for about 30 minutes while he heard others being beaten. Finally Myint’s group was told to
stand up and march to the trucks.198
After about 10 minutes of sitting in
terror, Htay said his group was told to
slowly crawl up the embankment, keep
their heads down, and not look at the
killing going on around them. If they
ran, they would be killed. Htay said that
he did keep his head down and that as
he climbed through the grove he was
climbing past body parts—arms, hands,
legs, and feet—that had been hacked
off.199
When Yon and her family made it to
the road, she said they were told to sit
down again. As she turned to reposition herself, this witness reported seeing a man behind her near the grove
holding up the decapitated head of a
Muslim by the hair. The facial muscles
were still twitching. Then she heard a
monk say, “If you want to kill the plant,
you need to cut the root. If you come
back, we will kill you all.”200
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Sein’s group was told to move to the
main road. At that point, as they tried
to go forward, large mobs in front of
them and behind them blocked their
path so they couldn’t escape. He said
the attackers were beating people with
bamboo sticks, and killing them with
knives and swords. They were cutting
people’s throats and doing “many bad
things.” [Sein’s eyes opened wide. He
looked afraid, teared up, and the interview was stopped.]201
Piles of charred corpses lie strewn
across the field
MP Win Htein was present and stood
among the crowd on the main road
along the embankment. According to
this member of Parliament, the police
commissioner and district commissioner
were also present. Win Htein reported
that some 200 police were present,
and none intervened to prevent or
stop the killings. He saw seven young
teenagers who were dead, lying in
the grassy area below.202 Thant saw
“many black” [charred] bodies on the
ground.203 Maung saw seven bodies on
the ground after the group was finally
told to get up and go to the military
trucks nearby.204 As Myint walked looking down with his arms above his head,
he saw three lifeless bodies at his feet.
The mob continued to attack them as
they mounted the trucks.205 According
to Win Htein, the bodies lay on the
ground for two days. Finally, municipal
workers were instructed to pick up the
bodies and take them to the crematorium. They were not identified nor were
their families notified.206
The police told the seated group to
climb up the embankment where
three trucks were parked on the main
road.207 The policemen loaded some
students onto the first truck, and
the women and girls were put in the
second truck.208 A monk yelled to the
police while they were loading, “Take
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Htun made a list of all the students in
the jail. From one of the police officers,
Htun bought a notebook for 200 kyat
(about 25 cents) and then wrote down
the names (both Burmese and Arabic),
ages, fathers’ names, and addresses
of 88 students. [During the interview,
Htun drew a detailed map of the police
station.]216 Phyu remembered giving
Htun all of this information, which he
wrote down on paper.217 Later that
afternoon, Myint could see through the
cracks in the wall a mob of armed men
outside the police station. Buddhist
monks were among them.218

A man takes pictures of burnt bodies in Meiktila, Burma on March 22, 2013.
Photo: STR/AFP/Getty Images
them to Yin Taw Village [a Muslim enclave], where they belong!”209 When
Aung got to the trucks, two of the
three were already filled. His group
climbed onto the third truck and he
estimates they rode for about 15 minutes until they arrived at Meiktila’s
No. 2 police station at around noon
on March 21.210
Police detain survivors at No. 2
police station in Meiktila
When the students, teachers, and other
residents of Mingalar Zayyone quarter
arrived at the police station, more than
80 students and teachers were separated from the others and put in one
packed room inside the station.211
Htay lay on the floor and slept “for a
long time.” When he woke up he had
a very bad headache and was dizzy.
Then he noticed that his hands were
extremely painful and he couldn’t move
them. One of his friends told him he
had blood all over his back. He then
realized he had been cut in several places. He had wounds on his left thumb
and forearm and right hand, and

several superficial—although heavily
bleeding—wounds on his back.212 Htay
could not pinpoint the moment he was
injured, although he recalled passing
out soon after the armed men started
beating him.
Thiri said that during the first two hours
at the police station, the police “gave
us a lot of sermons. They said they
sympathized with us and that they had
tried to save our lives. And they said
they were sorry for what happened.”
Some of the police said, “We are afraid
of the monks too, and the monks hate
us for saving your lives.”213
Aung said some of the police called
the Muslim detainees “terrorists.” They
were given a small amount of rice and
water each day. Maung said he received only three biscuits and water.214
Aung also said that a military officer
wearing three stars came to the police station and told his group to keep
calm.215

Muslim survivors are reunited with
their families
At 10 a.m. Saturday, March 23, most
of the detained students and several
teachers were loaded into three buses and driven with police escort to
Tapatswe village about 90 minutes
away near Mandalay where they were
reunited with their families. They arrived around 11:30 a.m. and were taken to a mosque where they were fed.
Township authorities and religious leaders wrote down the names of students
before they left with their families who
had come to pick them up.219 [During
the interview, Phyu began to cry at this
point and said how much he missed his
friends who were killed.]220
Myint remained in the police station
with his older cousin, his aunt, and her
three young children.221 They remained
because they were not part of the
group of students being transferred.222
On March 24 the group of six was
picked up by Htun’s relatives who had
come to drop off food for the detainees. He and his female relatives were
then able to leave the police station
with their relatives.223
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Corroborating Evidence

PHR used other forms
of documentation
to corroborate the
events described in the
eyewitness interviews:

1
2
3
4
5
6

Visual verification of
actual locations of reported
human rights violations
Review of photographic,
video, and satellite evidence

Physical evaluation of
one survivor

Psychological distress
among survivors

Comparison of the community’s
list of the missing (presumed)
dead, with eyewitness accounts
Corroboration of data with
concurrent events reported
in several media accounts

1. Visual verification of actual
locations of reported human rights
violations
The PHR team twice visited the scene
of the massacre in the Mingalar
Zayyone quarter in Meiktila. The PHR
team visited and photographed all 13
mosques in the city, of which 12 were
damaged or destroyed. The team also
visited the three principal madrassas
within Meiktila and documented the
destruction, as well as determined the
location of five temporary camps for
displaced persons in and around the
city. The team also photographed the
extensive damage to Muslim businesses and homes throughout Meiktila.
Photographs were taken with a Nikon
Coolpix AW100, a Sony DSC-WX80,
and an iPhone 5. Two of the cameras,
the Nikon Coolpix and iPhone, are
capable of recording GPS coordinates
on each image. The team logged all images into a photographic database, recording the image number, description,
time, date, and GPS location of the site.
2. Review of photographic, video,
and satellite evidence
The PHR team also reviewed over
450 photos and 37 videos taken on
March 23 by Hein Aung, a professional
Burmese journalist and photographer,
two days after the massacre. Hein
Aung also accompanied PHR investigators on both of the trips into Meiktila
to photograph the physical destruction.
He indicated where he had taken specific photographs on March 23.
PHR investigators also interviewed
Jason Szep, a Reuters journalist who
was at the scene of the massacre on
March 24. He wrote: “[O]n the hill
where Muslim bodies were burned, this
reporter found the remains of a mix of
adults and children: pieces of human
skull, vertebrae and other bones, and
a singed child ’s backpack. Nearby,
municipal trucks dumped bodies in a
field next to a crematorium in Meiktila’s
outskirts. They were burned with old
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tires.” Reuters and other news media
published images of these burning
corpses.
In addition, PHR investigators reviewed
some 30 videos taken by unidentified
individuals at a number of the alleged
incidents that marked the violence over
the period March 20-21. Comparison
of landmarks in the PHR investigators’
photographs to landmarks in the videos
suggests, though cannot confirm, that
these videos record the events described to PHR investigators by eyewitnesses and documented in this report.
One video in particular shows several
piles of burning bodies in the area
where the eyewitnesses reported that
many of the killings had taken place.
The PHR team also reviewed Human
Rights Watch (HRW) satellite images
of the city of Meiktila, recorded on
the morning of March 26, 2013, and
compared them with images taken on
December 13, 2012. HRW identified an
estimated total of 828 destroyed and
35 severely damaged buildings within
the city, likely caused by arson attacks
reported to have occurred.224
In an effort to authenticate photographs and videos reportedly taken at
the site and time of the killings, PHR
investigators twice traveled to Meiktila
to visually inspect, photograph, and log
GPS coordinates of the alleged crime
scene. Through comparison analysis of
landmarks and other distinctive objects
in the vicinity captured in PHR photographs and videos, PHR investigators
conclude that these photographs and
videos are highly likely to be authentic
and thus constitute strong evidence
of the killings that the witnesses have
recounted in this report. In addition,
logged GPS coordinates and visual inspection of the crime scene corroborate
destruction that HRW satellite images
captured.
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3. Physical evaluation of the healed
wounds of one survivor
On April 27, a PHR physician interviewed and examined Htay, an adult
student at the Mingalar Zayyone
school. As reported above, he was attacked by several men—he could not
estimate the number because they descended upon him so quickly—armed
with sticks, chains and swords. He was
knocked down, got up once, but then
was struck down again. At that point,
Htay lost consciousness for what he
guesses were just a few minutes. Upon
regaining consciousness, he tried to
quickly catch up with his group. He did
not notice his injuries until he arrived
at the police station. While at the police station, he suffered from a severe
headache, experienced dizziness, and
was bleeding from wounds on both his
hands, his left forearm, and his back.
He has suffered no subsequent symptoms except for insomnia and nightmares. He received one stitch at the
police station for the laceration on his
left hand. He specifically gave consent
for the PHR investigator to examine and
photograph his healed wounds.
Htay was anxious, although in control
of his emotions, during the exam.
Inspection revealed several well-healed
lacerations: (1) a 5-cm laceration
running from the thenar eminence
around the base of the thumb onto
the dorsal aspect of the hand; (2) a
2-cm straight laceration on the left
forearm; (3) three small lacerations on
the back of the right hand, forming a
slight arc measuring about 5 cm total;
and (4) four lacerations at various
angles on his back. Two lacerations
measured approximately 10 cm, one
measured approximately 16 cm and
one measured 20 cm. All six lacerations
are highly consistent with his testimony
of being struck with a weapon such as
a sword or knife.

4. Psychological distress among
survivors
All eight students whom PHR investigators interviewed reported some psychological distress. Sixteen-year-old Maung
has nightmares nearly every night. He
dreams of his friends whom he saw
killed and wakes up crying.225 Twelveyear-old Myint also has nightmares
each night and said that a doctor gave
him medication so he could sleep.226
One of the teenage students, Lwin,
said that the smell of the burning
bodies was overwhelming, and that
he now has olfactory flashbacks and
trouble sleeping. One of the recurring
nightmares he has is reliving the scene
of roving dogs eating the flesh of the
dead bodies in the grove. He also has
nightmares in which he sees the conflagration of the school, and people from
his neighborhood fleeing the scene
and screaming. He cries “almost every
day” and feels very fearful about the
future.227

6. Corroboration of data
with concurrent events reported
in the media
As of early May 2013, PHR’s analysis of
independent media coverage yielded
reports of anti-Muslim unrest in an
estimated 26-28 townships in Burma
during and after the March 20-23 violence in Meiktila.228 Property damage
was reported in approximately 19-20 of
these townships. Another eight townships reportedly experienced new or
increased anti-Muslim propaganda or
vandalism during this period, reportedly
causing Muslim residents to pre-emptively flee from at least one of these
townships.229 The majority of documented violence in Meiktila took place
during March 20-23. While estimates
vary, the Meiktila violence seems to
have sparked more than 160 incidents
in as many as 15 townships, towns, or
villages.

5. Comparison of community’s
list of the missing with eyewitness
accounts
PHR investigators were given a list of
names of students and teachers of
Mingalar Zayyone madrassa, or residents of the Mingalar Zayyone quarter,
who were still unaccounted for and
presumed dead. Muslim community
leaders compiled the list after consulting with families. The list included the
names of 33 students, four teachers,
and 38 residents of the quarter. PHR
asked each of the 14 eyewitnesses
whether they had personally witnessed
the death of someone they knew, and
if so, requested the person’s name.
Based on their responses, of the 75
names on the community list, PHR was
able to account for 20 of these people.
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Conclusions

T

he 14 eyewitness accounts
presented in this report,
corroborated by other documentation, provide compelling evidence that police
officers were complicit in
violent crimes against civilians. Such
acts on the part of law enforcement
officers blatantly violate even the most
rudimentary provisions of Burma’s own
penal code230 as well as international
norms. The UN Code of Conduct for
Law Enforcement Officials, for example, stipulates that police officers must
protect people from crime,231 and this
service to the community is intended to
include rendering assistance to those
who are in need of immediate aid. The
standards require law enforcement
officials to protect the rights of all people.232

The eyewitness reports detailed in this
report demonstrate that the majority of
police officers present during the violence in Meiktila fell far short of this
professional standard, not only by
failing to protect vulnerable children
and others at risk but by failing to
apprehend the perpetrators. The crimes
in Meiktila indicate a failure of leadership within the Burmese police force
that must be addressed through effective accountability mechanisms and
security-sector reform.

The testimonies of those interviewed by
PHR demand a concerted and effective
response from both the Government of
Burma and the international community. The serious crimes documented
in this report require immediate action: an independent investigation of
the violence and accountability for all
perpetrators in compliance with fair
and internationally recognized legal
standards.
The crimes in Meiktila occurred in a
general national context marked by
a lack of accountability for perpetrators of human rights violations. The
Government of Burma must respond
effectively not only to this incident but
to the long history of systematic human
rights violations on the part of Burmese
authorities. The people of Burma face
the important long-term task of building a society based on tolerance and
understanding, and reckoning with
past violence is a key element of this
social reconciliation. The Government
of Burma has an important role to play
in this process, and must institutionalize the protection of minority groups
across the country and establish and
maintain effective accountability mechanisms in order to move the country
out of a culture of violence.
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Policy Recommendations

To the Government of Burma:
Senior officials, pro-democracy
advocates, and religious leaders should
publicly and repeatedly condemn
all ethnic and religious violence and
intimidation, and should demonstrate
by their words and actions that such
discrimination and hateful rhetoric will
not be tolerated. The Government of
Burma should also:
• Immediately allow unfettered access
by human rights investigators,
journalists, and humanitarian aid
workers to Meiktila, areas of Rakhine
State, and other places where acts of
anti-Muslim violence have occurred.
• Institutionalize protections for ethnic
and religious minority groups by:
(1) completely revising Burma’s
citizenship law so that it reflects
international norms; (2) reforming
the structure of the military and
police to establish accountability
mechanisms; (3) bringing an end
to ethnic discrimination in all
sectors; and (4) encouraging full civil
participation by minority groups.
• Provide mental health counseling
and other appropriate health care
for those affected by the violence,
with a special focus on the particular
needs of children.
• Collaborate with international
humanitarian agencies, including
the International Committee of the
Red Cross and UNICEF, to trace
missing children and reunite families
separated by the violence.
• Promote the protection of children by
adhering to the Minimum Standards
for Child Protection in Humanitarian
Action, promulgated by the Child
Protection Working Group.
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To the international community:
• Immediately establish an
international, independent
investigation of the massacre in
Meiktila as well as other sites of
anti-Muslim violence. Members of
the United Nations Human Rights
Council should direct the Office of
the High Commissioner for Human
Rights to conduct this necessary
investigation. The Government
of Burma should cooperate with
any investigation and assist in
implementing any recommendations
from the investigators.
• Tie economic aid to and investment
in Burma to the Burmese
government’s allowing unfettered
access to areas of violence to human
rights investigators, journalists,
and humanitarian aid workers
and to the government’s progress
in investigating and prosecuting
perpetrators of the violence. Until the
Burmese government has established
full accountability for security forces
and has undertaken significant steps
toward structural reforms as outlined
above, no security assistance should
be provided.

Physicians for Human Rights

22

Map: PHR-Verified Destruction of Mosques
and Islamic Schools in the City of Meiktila,
Burma March 20-23, 2013
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Residents look at the charred remains of burnt bodies in Meiktila, Burma on March 23, 2013.
Photo: Soe Than WIN/AFP/Getty Images
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